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Abstract
The eﬃcacy of monetary authority actions depends primarily on the ability of the monetary
authority to aﬀect inﬂation expectations, which ultimately depend on agents’ trust. We propose
a model embedding trust cycles, as emerging from sequential coordination games betwen atom-
istic agents and the policy maker, in a monetary model. Trust aﬀects agents’ stochastic discount
factor, namely the price of future risk, and their expectation formation process: these eﬀects in
turn interact with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer
survey we analyze the link between trust on the one side and the transmission mechanism of
shocks and of the policy rate on the other: data show that the two interact signiﬁcantly and in
a way comparable to the obtained in our model.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large literature has shown that trust aﬀects growth, stability and the business cycle1:t r u s t
facilitates economics transactions2, particularly ﬁnancial ones, and improves the functioning of
institutions3. So far the literature has focused on trust among agents involved in economic trans-
actions or citizens served by institutions; little has been written upon trust in large institutions
such as policy makers, although the eﬀectiveness of economic policies largely depend upon that.
The eﬃcacy of monetary policies in particular depends upon the ability of the policy maker to
aﬀect agents’ future expectations: the latter is tightly linked to trust. Equally credibility and
accountability of central banks are endogenously determined by the level of trust in the monetary
authority. Importantly trust in policy makers tends to ﬂuctuates with the business cycle: crises for
instance tend to disrupt it.
We provide a model in which trust (in the monetary authority) is determined endogenously
within a sequential coordination game between a large number of atomistic agents and one large
player, the policy maker: the equilibrium level of trust aﬀects preferences and the stochastic dis-
count factor, namely the subjective pricing of future risk, which in turn aﬀect agents’ expectation
formation and the monetary transmission mechanism.
We begin by examining the interaction between trust, macroeconomic variables and monetary
policy using data from the Eurobarometer survey. We focus our attention on the euro area: the
newly created central bank provides a natural experiment to assess the role of evolving trust. The
mere occurrence of the monetary policy relinquishing by a number of countries materializes and
requires as necessary condition the existence of trust in the newly created monetary authority.
Several technical challenges arise in our empirical analysis. The ﬁrst is an intrinsic endogeneity
between the two sets of variables: the eﬃcacy of monetary policy and its control over future
expectations are high when the monetary authority is trustworthy; on reverse a successful monetary
policy does increase the level of public trust. A second issue lies in the distinction between long
run and short run eﬀects. Generally speaking monetary policy has short run eﬀects, hence if a link
exist between trust and monetary policy then it must become apparent at high frequencies: for
1See Knack and Keefer [15], Alesina and La Ferrara [2], Stevenson and Wolfers [23] among others.
2See Arrow [5].
3See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales [13].
2this reasons we use a two stage procedure. First we assess the link between trust and a number
of long run socio-economic characteristics; in a second step we establish the link between short
run ﬂuctuations in trust and the monetary transmission mechanism. We employ a number of
econometric techniques to deal with this and other econometric issues. Our empirical analysis
highlights three main ﬁndings. First, the variable that is closely related to the ECB’s mandate,
namely HICP inﬂation deviation from the target level, directly aﬀects trust building. Our analysis
suggests that a one-time deviation from the mandate, i.e. a policy that results in a one-time
increase in inﬂation beyond the implicit target level, has a persistent and negative impact on the
trust-building process. Second, we ﬁnd that also other variables, such as GDP growth, which are
not directly within the ECB mandate, can have an impact on the level of trust. Overall, we shall
conclude that a model with trust building should account for the dependence of trust upon policy
and macroeconomic variables. Third, a positive shock to trust is associated with an increase in the
real interest rate: as the monetary authority becomes more trustworthy, inﬂation expectations fall
and the real rate raises (for given nominal rate).
To rationalize our empirical ﬁndings we construct a model in which trust emerges as an equi-
librium outcome of an sequential coordination game between a continuum of atomistic agents and
the monetary authority4. We embed the game outlined within a standard monetary model to an-
alyze the link between trust and the monetary transmission mechanism. The equilibrium level of
trust aﬀects preferences and through this it aﬀects the stochastic discount factor, namely the price
of future risk. Generally speaking an increase in trust reduces the price of future risk and increases
aggregate demand: both households’ propensity to consume and ﬁrms’ propensity to hire increase.
More speciﬁcally when the degree of monetary authority trustworthiness increases, agents experi-
ence a fall in inﬂation’s expectation and perceive an improvement of the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ.
We ﬁnd that the transmission of shocks and monetary policy in our model is generally in line with
the one found in the data.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence of the link between
trust and monetary policy. Section 3 presents the model, which includes the trust game between
the agents and the monetary authority as well as the link with the rest of the aggregate model
4We assume that the monetary authority acts under commitment due to the mandate written in its statute: in
this way we are able to isolate the eﬀe c t so ft r u s tf r o mt h a to fl a c ko fc r e d i b i l i t y .
3economy. Section 4 discusses model results. Section 5 concludes. Appendices, ﬁgures and tables
follow.
2 Empirical evidence
The aim of our empirical analysis is to evaluate the link between trust and macroeconomic perfor-
mance in general and between trust and the monetary transmission mechanism more speciﬁcally.
Our trust variable will be constructed using the answers from the Eurobarometer survey.
Few main issues deserve discussion in relation to our empirical analysis.
The ﬁrst lies in the distinction between long run and short run eﬀects. Most of the previous
empirical analysis on trust have focused on its long run eﬀects (for instance on GDP growth) and
have assessed the power of well entrenched institutions in promoting trust building. Our aim is
to assess the link between trust and monetary policy, hence our focus is on short run ﬂuctuations
at business cycle frequencies. For this reason we need to isolate the long run determinants from
the short run ﬂuctuations of trust. We do so through the following two step procedure. In a ﬁrst
step and using micro-econometric techniques, we regress our proxy variable for trust on a number
of socio-economic characteristics: the ﬁtted regression accounts for the long run determinants of
trust, while the ﬁtted residual, which we label net trust, can explain its short run ﬂuctuations. In
the second stage we asses the link between net trust and monetary policy using traditional time
series analysis.
A second issue to consider is the potential endogeneity between macroeconomic performance
and trust. A high level of trust in economic institutions may increase the willingness of households to
consume and of ﬁrms to invest. On the other hand, good macroeconomic performance might be an
indicator of the well-functioning of economic institutions, which in turn triggers an increase in their
trustworthiness. This double-way causality implies that regressing a measure of macroeconomic
and/or monetary policy indicators on a measure of trust or vice versa is un-appropriate. We
address the temporal endogeneity issue by employing VAR estimation techniques.
Our empirical analysis will also consider a shock to trust. A third issue then concerns the
choice of the identiﬁcation assumptions. In this respect we maintain a conservative agnostic view
and deal with this issue by resorting on Generalized Impulse Response Functions. We will return
4on this point later on.
2.1 Eurobarometer Surveys and Macroeconomic Data
We use data from Eurobarometer surveys which are conducted on behalf of the European Com-
mission at least twice a year in all European Union (EU) member countries. The survey covers
a rich set of demographic characteristics in order to monitor the social and political attitudes of
households in all EU member countries. More speciﬁcally, we combine a selected set of 25 Euro-
barometer surveys in order to build a unique semi-annual repeated cross section from 1999 to 2011.
One strength of the survey is that several questions on attitudes towards European institutions
are asked at least twice a year, which makes it possible to construct our main variable of interest,
namely the perceived trust in the European Central Bank (ECB), in all data sets. Speciﬁcally, the
surveys ask the participants:
“And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? (READ
OUT): The European Central Bank”
The survey participants are then given the choice between the three possible answers: “1, Tend
to trust”’, “2, Tend not to trust”, and “3, Do not know”. The surveys also contain substantive
information on survey participants’ socio-economic characteristics which proves useful in the process
of calculating aggregate trust statistics (see section 2.2). Macroeconomic variables are obtained from
Eurostat and Thomson Reuters Datastream. Semi-annual GDP growth rates are calculated using
quarterly data on seasonally adjusted chain-linked real GDP, while the inﬂation rate refers to the
semi-annual change in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The Euro Over Night
Index Average (EONIA) rate refers to the average rate within the respective semester. Semester
data were constructed following Roth et al. [20] in order to match the Eurobarometer surveys with
macroeconomic data.
Table 1 contains a description of the dataset and tables 2 and 3 contain summary statistics
for a number of variables.
2.1.1 Aggregate Trust Statistics and Long Run Determinants of Trust
Our ﬁrst task lies in constructing a trust variable using the binary measure resulting from the
Eurobarometer surveys: the latter shall be indeed transformed into a continuous variable.
5First, a straightforward way would be to simply calculate the average level of trust for each
country and time period. However, whether or not an individual does trust the ECB has an
inherently subjective component. Hence, socio-economic factors are likely to play a predominant
role in the trust-building process. The resulting average level of trust is therefore necessarily
related to an individual with average socio-economic characteristics (e.g. average gender, average
occupation, and average education): neglecting such links may not be desirable. Indeed in this case
ﬂuctuations in the level of trust may very well partly reﬂect long-run dynamics. As we are interested
in explaining short-run dynamics of, for instance, key monetary policy rates, it is reasonable to
ﬁrst generate a time series reﬂecting short-run dynamics of aggregate trust in the ECB.
In this respect, we assume that individual socio-economic characteristics are the drivers of the
average or long-run level of trust, respectively. We use those characteristics in order to extract the
component of trust that is not due to individual traits (i.e. the component of trust that is mostly
associated with short-run dynamics). The binary trust variable, obtained through the survey data,
is ﬁrst regressed on this set of socio-economic indicators. The unexplained components (i.e. the
regression residuals) can then be aggregated on a country/time period basis. The new times series
of aggregated residuals constitutes a new measure of trust net of individual traits (in what follows
referred to as net trust) which can be incorporated in the second stage VAR estimation.
Concerning the two-stage estimation strategy, it is essential to have the most accurate coeﬃ-
cient estimates on the ﬁrst stage that are subsequently used in order to calculate the aggregated
regression residuals for the second stage. Therefore, much attention has to be paid to the choice
of the methodology used in the ﬁrst stage. We use the most complex, or fully-saturated, linear
probability model (LPM) that incorporates a separate parameter for each cell deﬁn e db yt h ev a l u e s
of the covariates. Hence, the model includes binary independent variables for mutually exclusive
and exhaustive categories such that each individual in the population can be assigned exactly one
category. It is appealing to estimate such a model in the ﬁrst stage as it ﬁts the conditional ex-
pectation function (CEF) denoted by [|] with  being a vector of initial covariates perfectly.
Furthermore, the fully-saturated model is non-parametric and requires much less restrictive func-
tional form assumptions compared to the case where the binary dependent variable is modelled in
a nonlinear way. This is in particular true for probit or logit estimation procedures. Fitted values
6(i.e. predicted probabilities5) of individuals in cell  are simply equivalent to  where  is
the sum of the binary dependent variable and  the number of observations within cell , respec-
tively. Hence, ﬁtted values obtained from such a model exactly match empirically observed cell
frequencies conditional on the values of the covariates6. We restrict ourselves to a parsimonious set
of socio-economic indicators used in the ﬁrst stage estimation that nevertheless includes the most
relevant socio-economic characteristics. Those characteristics are gender (male, female), marital
status (couple, single, divorced, widowed), employment status (employed, self-employed, retired,
unemployed), educational attainment (less than high school degree, high school degree, college de-
gree), and political orientation (left-wing political view, center- or right-wing political view). In
order to be able to capture nonlinearities in the age response as suggested by microeconometric
studies, age is controlled for using multiple categories. A detailed variable description and summary
statistics can be found in tables 1 up to 3.
In order to illustrate the importance of socio-economic characteristics in the trust-building
process, table 4 presents the results of a non-saturated LPM only including the main eﬀects of
interest7. Notice however that the net trust variable used in the subsequent time-series analyses is
instead based on the results from the fully-saturated model. In table 4 (1) we present the results
for the socio-economic characteristics whereas in table 4 (2) we additionally include country ﬁxed
eﬀects, which absorb most of the country-wide diﬀerences. As expected, we ﬁnd that socio-economic
characteristics inﬂuence the trust-building process signiﬁcantly. Being a couple or single compared
to being widowed seem to be a trust-building characteristic. Males have a higher probability of
trust compared to females. The probability of trust in the ECB of unemployed citizens is lower
compared to those who are employed. The better educated individuals are, the more likely it is
that they have trust in the ECB. A college degree, for instance, increases the probability of trust
in the ECB, whereas individuals, whose political views are to the left of the political spectrum, are
5Fitted values can be interpreted as probabilities given that fully-saturated LPM produce ﬁtted values that are
always inside the unit interval (Wooldridge [25]). This, however, need not be the case for LPM in general.
6For fully-saturated models that include a considerable number of categorical variables, generating a variable
for cell-membership for each observation in the sample and then calculating conditional cell averages of the binary
trust variable in contrast to performing regression analyses is a computationally less demanding way of calculating
ﬁtted values or predicted probabilities. For more information on fully-saturated models see, for instance, Angrist and
Pischke [4] and Wooldridge [25].
7The inclusion solely of the main eﬀects of interest imposes the restriction that all interaction eﬀects between the
initial covariates are zero and hence the model is not an admissible estimator of the CEF in the ﬁrst stage.
7less likely to show trust.
Before proceeding with the time-series analysis at business cycle frequencies, it is nevertheless
of interest to comment on the long run evolution of trust across main euro area countries. Figure 8
shows the evolution of trust in the ECB and ECB net trust for selected countries used in our study.
One feature of the data is that even though the combined Eurobaometer surveys do not constitute
a panel, but rather a repeated cross section (the surveys do not follow the same individuals over
time), ﬂuctuations of ECB net trust to a large extent mirror those of the original trust in the
ECB variable. For each country, both series are almost perfectly correlated indicating that the
composition of survey participants across diﬀerent Eurobarometer surveys is similar.
2.1.2 Link between Trust and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
As mentioned earlier the empirical assessment of the link between trust on the one side and macro-
economic and monetary policy variables on the other is done using VAR estimation. This allows
us to partly address the temporal double causality between the two sets of variables. We rely on
standard VAR models of the form:
 = ()−1 +  +  (1)
where  and  are vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. () is a
matrix polynomial of order  in the lag operator ,  is a coeﬃcient vector conformable with the
dimension of ,a n d are the regression residuals. As the sample for the Euro area countries
is rather short (1999:S1-2011:S1), country-based VAR estimations are not feasible. Therefore we
estimate VAR models on pooled panel data, controlling for country-speciﬁc heterogeneity and
assuming slope homogeneity in line with Ciccarelli et al. [10].
The VAR models are estimated using ECB net trust and several macroeconomic indicators.
Here we consider real GDP growth, and HICP inﬂation. Notice that the ECB has adopted an
implicit inﬂation target of (below but close) to 2 percent: for this reason it is reasonable to believe
that the response of trust to changes in inﬂation is asymmetric across the whole support of inﬂation.
Therefore, we use HICP inﬂation deviation from the target level as endogenous variable: this is
consistent with agents’ beliefs that the central bank objective does penalize inﬂation deviation from
8the target. Finally, we proxy the policy rate for the euro area using the EONIA rate. There are
several reasons for which the EONIA rate is a good proxy of the monetary stance. One, among
many others, is that this rate is well suited to capture the monetary stance in times of crisis.
Recently indeed the Eurosystem has experienced a signiﬁcant number of unconventional monetary
policy measures8. As a result we observed a substantial reduction of the EONIA rate below the
interest rate on the main reﬁnancing operations (Beirne [9], and Trichet [24]). This proves that the
EONIA is more responsive to unconventional monetary measures compared to other market rates.
Furthermore, in order to assess whether certain features of the data are crisis-speciﬁc, the
sample is split into two, the crisis and the non-crisis samples. A dating of the beginning of the
current crisis, however, is to a certain extent arbitrary. We date the beginning of the crisis con-
servatively and deﬁne the ﬁnancial turmoil of August 2007 inter alia associated with the United
States subprime mortgage market and severe tensions in interbank markets around the globe as
the starting point of the active phase of the crisis (see, for instance, Angelini et al. [3], Duchin
et al. [11], and Trichet [24]). The ﬁeldwork of the Eurobarometer 68.1 survey was conducted in
September and October 2007. As such, we assign data corresponding to the second semester of
2007 (i.e. 2007:S2) to the crisis period. Dating the beginning of the crisis accordingly is not only
in line with the literature but ensures that enough observations, corresponding to the crisis period,
are available such that VAR estimations for the crisis period are feasible. This will be of particular
importance in order to analyze whether certain features of the date are due to the occurrence of
the ﬁnancial crisis.
We consider two variants of our VAR speciﬁcation. In the ﬁrst variant (labeled Model 1)
the endogenous variables are ECB net trust as deﬁn e da b o v e ,r e a lG D Pg r o w t h ,H I C Pi n ﬂation
deviation from the target level, and the EONIA rate (whole sample). In the second variant (labelled
Model 2) the endogenous variables are ECB net trust as deﬁned before, real GDP growth, and the
EONIA rate (crisis sample only).
If feasible, the VAR lag length  is determined using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC).
The reason for this choice is twofold. First, the SIC consistently estimates the true lag length of
a VAR model. Second, the penalization for additional lags of the endogenous variables is higher
8Among other things, commercial banks in the euro area were oﬀered liquidity assistance through a ﬁxed-rate
tender procedure with full allotment at the interest rate on the main reﬁnancing operations starting in October 2008.
9compared to alternative information criteria (see Lütkepohl [16]). This property is appealing since
our sample for the Euro area is rather short: there is then a concrete risk that the selected VAR
lag length is higher than the true lag length9.
The models are evaluated by means of impulse response functions. We follow the methodology
of generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) introduced by Koop et al. [14] for nonlinear
models and Pesaran and Shin [17] for linear models. Appealing properties of GIRF, compared
to orthogonalized impulse response functions in the spirit of Sims [22], are that GIRF do not
require an orthogonalization of shocks using the Cholesky decomposition and that the ordering of
the endogenous variables in the VAR model is irrelevant for further inference. In particular the
latter feature is important in our case as there is limited conventional wisdom or little economic
theory that would justify one particular Cholesky ordering for further impulse response inference.
In order to calculate GIRF, single elements of the residual vector are shocked and the eﬀects of all
other shocks are integrated out using the distribution of residuals. The mean impulse response is
shown together with +/- two standard deviations conﬁdence bands such that roughly 95 per cent
of observations lie within these intervals, assuming normally distributed impulse responses.
2.1.3 Results of the Time Series Analysis
We star by examining the results arising from the ﬁrst VAR speciﬁcation considered, namely that
of Model 1. Impulse response functions to one standard deviation innovations can be found in
ﬁgures 9 and 10: the ﬁrst ﬁgures show impulse responses of selected variables to shocks to GDP
growth and to the EONIA rate, while the second ﬁgure shows impulse responses to shocks to net
trust and to the deviation of inﬂation from the target.
A shock to GDP growth only mildly aﬀects inﬂation deviation from the target level and
signiﬁcantly increases the EONIA rate and ECB net trust. As expected an increase in GDP
growth favorably aﬀects public conﬁdence in the monetary authority. A shock to the EONIA rate
only mildly aﬀects ECB net trust and inﬂation deviations from the target level, but depresses real
GDP growth signiﬁcantly in the short run. So to speak unexpected deviation in the monetary
policy stance do not disrupt public conﬁdence in the monetary authority. A one-time increase in
9In cases where the total number of available observations restricts the number of endogenous variables and in
particular the VAR lag length, the VAR speciﬁcations contain one lag for each included endogenous variable.
10ECB net trust has two main eﬀects. First it increases GDP growth up to semester three, before
turning negative up to semester ten: an increase in public conﬁdence provides an expansionary
boosts to the economy akin to that triggered by the Keynesian animal spirits. An increase in net
trust also reduces the prospects of future inﬂation growth: the public believes that the monetary
authority is able to control future inﬂation better and at the expenses of lower output costs. In
anticipation inﬂation falls on impact. The gain in credibility allows the monetary authority to
loosen the monetary stance on impact, although the nominal rate turns positive after the second
semester to counterbalance the inﬂationary pressures stemming from the increase in GDP. At last
we consider a shock (an increase) to inﬂation deviation from the target: this shock persistently
reduces ECB net trust. Inﬂation is the variable that most directly enters into the ECB mandate:
deviations from the target can disrupt public conﬁdence. The fall in trust depresses real GDP. The
monetary authority ﬁghts the initial increase in inﬂation by raising the nominal rates on impact,
but after two quarters it must loosen the policy stance in order to counterbalance the fall in output.
Next we examine the results arising from the speciﬁcation of Model 2. Selected impulse
response functions to one standard deviation innovations are reported in ﬁgure 11. The eﬀects of
a positive shock to ECB net trust are similar to the ones obtained from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation: the
main diﬀerence lies in the fact that GDP growth turns negative at the eighth semester. Similar
results compared to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation are obtained also for the other shocks considered.
At least three ﬁndings are interesting so far. First, variables that are not related to the ECB’s
mandate or variables that are outside its direct or indirect control, like real GDP growth, should
be irrelevant for the trust-building process, while our analysis show that they are also important
determinants of trust. One explanation for this relies on the assumption of bounded rational
agents10,w h o s el e v e lo fc o n ﬁdence in the authority is aﬀected by a number of other indicators.
GDP growth can for instance provide anchoring to beliefs formation. Second, the variable that
is closely related to the ECB’s mandate is HICP inﬂation deviation from the target level. Our
analysis suggests that a one-time deviation from the mandate, i.e. a policy that results in a one-
time increase in inﬂation beyond the implicit target level, has a persistent and negative impact on
the trust-building process. Hence, the issue of trust in the ECB is of particular importance for the
10See Barberis and Thaler [6] for an overview of the literature on behavioral ﬁnance.
11conduct and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy as credibility and trust are closely connected (see,
for instance, Barro and Gordon [7]). Decision makers have to take this persistent impact on trust
into account when deciding about future monetary policy that has the potential of letting inﬂation
deviate from its implicit target level. Third, an exogenous increase in trust allows the monetary
authority to reduce the policy rate on impact; the monetary policy turns however contractionary
soon after. As trust improves agents expect the monetary authority to be able to strike a better
balance between inﬂation and output growth in the future. This gain in credibility allows the
monetary authority to partly ease the policy rate on impact. The increase in GDP, following an
increase in trust, however forces the monetary authority to increase the policy rate in order to
control inﬂationary pressures.
We further perform a number of robustness exercises, non-reported for brevity but available
upon request. We analyze whether results are robust to diﬀerent measures of trust and to diﬀerent
proxies of the monetary policy stance. Results remain qualitatively the same when we replace
the net trust with the aggregate trust statistics. Moreover we repeat regressions by replacing the
EONIA rate alternatively with the ECB’s interest rate on the main reﬁnancing operations (the
ECB Policy Rate, which refers either to the minimum bid rate or the ﬁxed rate depending on the
respective time period) and the Euro Interbank Oﬀered Rate with a maturity of 3 month (EURI-
BOR 3m). Once again results are qualitatively similar to the ones outlined above. Furthermore,
results remain robust when we estimate Model 1 using the crisis sample: in this case the number
of parameters to be estimated relative to the total number of available observations is rather high
in this case, hence results are less reliable.
3 The Model
To rationalize our empirical results we build a macro model embedding a trust game between a
continuum of atomistic agents and a policy maker. The game is outlined in what follows. The un-
derlying monetary model embeds standard assumptions: monetary policy stance aﬀects aggregate
demand through the Euler equation and due to the assumption of sticky prices. We maintain those
standard assumptions, as our goal is to highlight the diﬀerence in the transmission mechanism
when time-varying trust is included in the model.
12Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the baseline trust game.
3.1 Baseline Trust Game
The setup of the baseline two-entity trust game is as follows. Player 1 (the proposer) decides
whether to trust () or not to trust () player 2 (the responder). If player 1 plays ,t h e
game ends with payoﬀs (1 1),w h e r e denotes the payoﬀ of player 1 and  the payoﬀ of player 2,
respectively. Conditional on choosing , player 2 has the choice between responding trustworthy
() with resulting payoﬀs (2 2) or not trustworthy () with payoﬀs (3 3).W ef o l l o w
the standard literature on trust games and assume that 1  2  3 and 3  1  2.T h e
extensive form of the game is depicted in ﬁgure 1 below. By backward induction, the (Pareto
inferior) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game (and also the one of ﬁnitely many
repetitions of the game) is () with resulting payoﬀs (1 1).
3.2 Extended Trust Game
We now extend the game by considering a continuum of atomistic agents on the one side of the game
and one single player, namely the policy maker, on the other side. Player 1 is a single atomistic
agent in the economy and player 2 is a policy maker, more speciﬁc a l l yt h ec e n t r a lb a n ki no u r
13case. Assume that all agents are alike except for their preferences provided that the central banks
responds with a not trustworthy action, . More precisely, agents are heterogeneous concerning
their individual degree of betrayal aversion, i.e. the dis-utility they receive from being cheated.
Consider that there is a continuum of agents and that each single agent is uniquely identiﬁed by
the corresponding degree of betrayal aversion  ∈ [01]. Hence, each agent is associated with a
point on the unit interval. Note that betrayal aversion only aﬀects the agent’s payoﬀ when the
central bank decides to play . This assumption also helps to rule out extreme coordination
equilibria, in which all agents decide either to trust or not to trust: those equilibria would indeed
deliver aggregate level of trusts of 100% or 0%, respectively. Therefore, the extended speciﬁcation
allows for an aggregate level of trust, namely the fraction of the population who trusts the policy
maker, which lies strictly within the unit interval  ∈ (01).
In order to ensure that the central bank does not always choose either  or  in ﬁnitely
many repetitions of the game, the central bank type is assumed to be stochastic. In every period the
nature draws stochastically the central banker’s preferences11: in this case the payoﬀ of the central
bank under the  action is the sum of a deterministic payoﬀ 3 and of a stochastic component 
with zero mean.12 The dispersion  is assumed to be drawn from a continuous uniform distribution
over the range [−] with 0 such that the probability density function reads 12.
Each single agent decides whether to choose  or . If the agent decides to play ,
the game ends with payoﬀs (1 1). Conditional on choosing , the central bank has the choice
between playing with resulting payoﬀs (2 2) or  with payoﬀs (2 − 3 + ).
Assumption 1. 1  3  2 and 1  2  1 +1 .
Lemma 1. The central bank plays  in the majority of the periods.
The proof of the above lemma follows directly from the assumption that 1  3  2. As
the random variable  has zero mean, in expectation playing  is a dominant strategy for the
11Alternatively one can think of the agents as being uncertain about the central banker’s preferences, so that the
payoﬀ of the game needs to account for such random outcomes.
12In principal, both central bank payoﬀs in the case followed by the agent choosing  can be made stochastic by
adding dispersions 1 and 2 such that the resulting payoﬀsa r e2 + 1 when the central bank chooses  and
3 + 2 when the central bank chooses . For the central bank’s decision, however, only the diﬀerence between
the two payoﬀs 3 −2 +2 −1 is relevant. Therefore, we redeﬁne 2 −1 ≡  without loss of generality such that
w ee n du pw i t ht h ep a y o ﬀss t a t e di nt h em a i nt e x t .
14Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the extended trust game.
central bank. The fraction of times in which the trustworthy strategy is played will depend upon
the variability of random payoﬀ.
Lemma 2. The action  is not a dominant strategy for all agents in the economy with
probability one.
The proof of the Lemma 2 follows directly from the assumption that 1  2 and 2 −1  1.
The extensive form of the extended two-entity trust game is depicted in ﬁgure 2 below. Recall
that the game features incomplete information on the side of agents, as they do not know with
certainty the type of central banker that the Nature will draw. For this reason each agent will
choose optimally its action by comparing expected payoﬀs based on prior probability densities.
The agent will trust,  if the expected payoﬀ of doing so is larger than or equal to 1 and
vice versa. The expected payoﬀ of choosing to trust,  for the agents, (Π) is given by:
(Π)= (2)
2( ≤ 2 − 3)+ ( 2 − )(  2 − 3)= (3)
2(2 − 3)+( 2 − )[1 − (2 − 3)] (4)
15where () denotes probability and () the cumulative distribution function conformable with the
distributional assumption of .N o t i n gt h a t()=( +)2 for  ∈ [−], it then follows that:
(Π)=2(
2 − 3 + 
2
)+( 2 − )(
3 − 2 + 
2
) (5)
Lemma 3. Agents will choose  if:
0 ≤  ≤
2(2 − 1)
3 − 2 + 
≡  (6)
The proof of the above lemma follows from the fact that  is the dominant strategy if (Π) ≥
1 while  is dominant if (Π)  1. Recall that in our economy there is a continuum of agents
and that  ∈ (01) identiﬁes the degree of betrayal aversion of each individual agent: the threshold
 therefore identiﬁes the marginal agent (hence the overall fraction of agents) which will choose to
trust.
Assumption 2. It is assumed that  2 − 3
The above assumption guarantees that  =
2(2−1)
3−2+  0.T h es u p p o r t ,[−] of the uniform
distribution for  must be chosen so that the central bank has an incentive to choose  at least
for some high realizations of . Depending on the speciﬁc value of , the agent will either decide
to trust or not to trust. This relation is depicted in ﬁgure 3.
Corollary 1. The fraction of agents  that plays  will solely be determined by the degree of
betrayal aversion of the marginal agent .M o r ep r e c i s e l y :
 = ,( 7 )
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game (and also the one of ﬁnitely many
repetitions of the game) is found through backward induction. In the second period, given the
fraction of agents that chooses to trust,  =  and for given realization of , the central bank will
16Figure 3: Graphical illustration of the relation between the degree of betrayal aversion  and the
agents’ decisions.
then play  against  if and only if 2  3 + .I nt h eﬁrst period, given the prior beliefs
on the realization of  the fraction of agents that chooses to trust is given as from Corollary 1.
Notice that the outcome of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium crucially depends upon the
degree of betrayal aversion. The lower the degree of betrayal aversion, the higher is agents’ payoﬀ
when the central bank is not trust-worthy and the higher is the fraction of agents who decide to
trust ex ante.
3.3 Aggregation and Representative Agent
Before embedding our trust game into a standard monetary model, we need to compute the agents’
aggregate payoﬀs. As all agents are symmetric, aggregation delivers the following realized payoﬀ
 for the representative agent:
Z 
0
2 −
Z 
0
[ 2 − 3] +
Z 1

1 (8)
⇔ 2 −
[ 2 − 3]
2

2
+( 1− )1,
where [] denotes an indicator function that is equal to one if  2 −3 and zero otherwise.
Note that the indicator function produces a discontinuity in this expression. However, [] can be
approximated by a continuous transition function which renders standard approximation techniques
feasible.13
The realized payoﬀ  of the central bank reads as follows:
13The transition function may read  ≡ (2 3)=1 [1 + exp(−( − 2 + 3))] with 0.F o r  →∞ ,
(2 3) → [ 2 − 3]. See, for instance, Rieth [19] or Bayoumi et al. ??.
17Z 
0
2 +
Z 
0
(3 − 2 + )[ 2 − 3] +
Z 1

1 (9)
⇔ 2 + (3 − 2 + )[ 2 − 3]+( 1− )1.
3.4 Implementing the Trust Game in a Macro Model
Our goal is to embed the trust game within a standard monetary/macro model. To this purpose
the next task is the formulation of aggregate preferences whose associated payoﬀsf e a t u r ear a n k i n g
comparable to the one assumed in the extended version of the trust game.
As explained earlier the assumption 2  1 is crucial to obtain well behaved equilibria, both
in the baseline and also the extended trust game. Having two distinct payoﬀs 1 and 2, however,
complicates the implementation of the trust game within an aggregate/macro model. To simplify
things we therefore introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3. 2 ≡ 1 and that 1
The above assumption ensures that 2  1.
Notice that the central bank’s payoﬀs parameters will not directly enter the agents’ behavioral
equations. We can therefore impose the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 4. 3 − 2 ≡ 2  0
Given the above assumption it is possible to deﬁne 1 ≡
2(−1)
2+  0 also since −2 due
to Assumption 2.
Lemma 4. Given assumptions 3 to 4, the aggregate fraction of trusting agents is given by:
 =  = 11 (10)
and the aggregate agents’ payoﬀ is given by:
 = 11 + 21 − 3()2, (11)
where 1 =1  2 =  − 1, and 3()=[−2]2.
18The calculation of the aggregate payoﬀ in the above lemma is obtained as follows:
 = 1 −
[−2]
2
2 +( 1− )1 (12)
= 1 +(  − 1)1 −
[−2]
2
2 =
= 11 + 21 − 3()2
To provide direct implementation of the above lemma, let’s assume that each agent in the
extended trust game has the following exponential Bernoulli utility function ()=1 −− ≡ 1,
where  denotes consumption,  refers to the location of the agent on the unit interval, and  is
the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
After rearranging and adding a time subscript  as well as an additive trust shock process 
14, the key expressions are given by:
 =  = 1(1 − −)+, (13)
( )=˜ 1( ) − ˜ 2()− (14)
where ˜ 1( )=1 + 2 − 3()2
 and ˜ 2()=1 + 2.
Depending on the speciﬁc realization of , the partial derivative of ( ) with respect
to aggregate trust  r e a d sa sf o l l o w s :
( )

=
½
2(1 − −) −  when   −2
2(1 − −) when  ≤− 2
 (15)
Lemma 5. The derivative ( )  0 when  ≤− 2 and the central bank
chooses to play . In the opposite case where   −2, the sign of the partial derivative
depends upon the levels of  and  and is positive when 2(1 − −)  .
Intuitively an increase in aggregate trust increases the welfare of the representative agent,
provided that the uncertainty surrounding the central banker’s type is not too large.
14Later on we will calibrate the parameters of this stochastic process based on estimates of an AR(1) process for
the Euro area using aggregate survey data.
19Corollary 2. The second derivative of the utility function with respect to  is negative when
 ≤− 2 a n dz e r oo t h e r w i s e .
An increase in trust raises consumption demand as the impact of uncertainty is less severe;
this in turn decreases the marginal utility of consumption.
The aggregate utility functions deﬁned above, 14, shall satisfy standard concavity assumptions
as they will be used in recursive optimization problems.
Lemma 6. The condition 0  1( −1) ≤ 12 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
concavity of the utility function 14.
In the numerical simulation, we will either ensure that the inequality stated in lemma 6 is
fulﬁlled or that consumption is in the range where the utility function of the representative agent
is concave.
Equations 13 and 14 together summarize the aggregate payoﬀ of the trust game and shall be
added to a standard monetary model to account for the link between equilibrium trust and the
policy transmission mechanism. Few considerations are worth notice at this stage. The level of
consumption  determines the betrayal aversion of the marginal agent in the economy,  This in
turn determines the aggregate level of equilibrium trust  using equation 13. Notice indeed that
trust in our model is a time-varying variables that ﬂuctuates in response to shocks: a shock to
technology, a change in the monetary policy stance or an exogenous increase in aggregate demand,
all trigger a change in public trust toward the policy maker. Second ﬂuctuations in the aggregate
equilibrium level of trust aﬀect the utility of the representative agent through its impact on 14, hence
it will aﬀect the agents’ stochastic discount factor, namely the subjective price of risk. Intuitively
when aggregate trust increases, the price of future risk falls. Changes in the price of future risk do
aﬀect the strength of the transmission mechanism. This is also the sense in which the monetary
transmission mechanism, operating via the impact of the policy rate on the agents’ consumption
Euler and/or ﬁrms’ future proﬁts, changes when the level of aggregate trust changes. We will
return on this point later.
203.5 Aggregate Economy
The underlying macro model is an otherwise standard monetary model. Sticky prices are introduced
to account for non-neutral eﬀects of monetary policy15. The economy consists of a representative
household, a representative ﬁnal good-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate good-producing
ﬁrms, and a monetary authority. The equilibrium level of trust enters the preferences of the
representative households, hence aﬀecting the stochastic discount factor.
3.5.1 Household
There is an inﬁnitely lived representative household who maximizes the expected discounted sum
of utilities
0
∞ X
=0
 £
( )+κ log(1 − )
¤
, (16)
where 0 1 is a constant discount factor,  ,,a n d denote consumption, aggregate
central bank trust, and labor hours, respectively. 0 is the expectations operator conditional on
information available at time  and  is the realization of the stochastic dispersion of the central
bank type. Real income in period  is composed of wage income 
 , bond holdings including
interest rate payments (1 + −1)
−1
 , and real aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts Ξ as ﬁrms are assumed to
be owned by the representative household. Notice that appendix 1 explains the assumptions that
allow us to neglect the eﬀect of heterogeneity in betrayal aversion on the labour supply. Hence, the
household’s budget constraint in real terms reads
 +


≤


 +( 1+−1)
−1

−  + Ξ, (17)
where  is the price level and  denotes real tax payments. Maximizing 16 subject to 17
with respect to , ,a n d gives rise to the following optimality conditions:

 = 
+1
µ
1+
+1
¶
(18)
15We have introduced our trust game also in an alternative set-up in which monetary non-neutrality is obtained
through liquidity eﬀects with cash in advance constraints. Results on this are not reported for brevity, but the main
conclusions related to the interaction between trust and the monetary policy remain valid within the alternative
monetary model.
21
 =
κ
(1 − )
(19)
where lower case letters denote real variables,
+1
 ≡ +1,a n d
 is the marginal utility of
consumption. Notice that the ﬂuctuations in trust aﬀect the marginal utility of consumption and
through this the stochastic discount factor which enters the consumption Euler. We will return on
this point later.
Note that by the consumption Euler equation it follows that the Fisher equation reads 1+ =
1+
+1 with  being the real interest rate.
3.5.2 Final good ﬁrm
There is a representative ﬁnal good-producing ﬁrm that operates under the following production
technology  =
⎡
⎣
1 Z
0
()
(−1)
 
⎤
⎦

(−1)
and uses () units of each intermediate good  in order to
produce  units of the ﬁnal good. Proﬁt maximization then implies the ﬁnal good-producing ﬁrm’s
demand for variety :
()=
µ
()

¶−
, (20)
where the parameter  represents the demand elasticity of individual varieties.
3.5.3 Intermediate good ﬁrms
Each intermediate good-producing ﬁrm  ∈ [01] has monopolistic power and leverage in setting the
price. In changing prices it faces a quadratic cost equal to 
2
³
()
−1() − 1
´2
where the parameter
 captures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The higher  the more costly are price changes
for the individual ﬁrm and the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. The case of
ﬂexible prices is nested and requires setting  =0 .E a c hﬁrm  assembles () units of labor from
the representative household in period  in order to operate a production technology for a distinct
variety  of an intermediate good:
(()) = (). (21)
22Each ﬁrm chooses a sequence {() ()} taking the nominal wage  as given, in order to
maximize expected discounted real proﬁts:
0
∞ X
=0
Λ0
∙
()

() − ()() −

2
(
()
−1()
− 1)2
¸
(22)
subject to the ﬁnal good-producing ﬁrm’s demand constraint for each variety . Λ0 ≡  


0
is the household’s stochastic discount factor and () the real marginal cost associated with ﬁrm
. The following ﬁrst order conditions hold, after aggregation and after imposing a symmetric
equilibrium:
 =  (23)
( − 1) = 

+1


(+1 − 1)+1 +


µ
 −
 − 1

¶
, (24)
where  denotes the marginal product of labor.
The last expression is the non-linear forward-looking Phillips curve in which deviations of
the real marginal cost from its steady-state value are the driving force of inﬂation. Notice that
the evolution of trust aﬀects the Phillips cure and inﬂation through the ﬁrms’ stochastic discount
factor. We will return on this point later in section 4.
3.5.4 Resource Constraint
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that the production of goods equals the sum of private
consumption, public spending, and the costs associated with price changes:
 =  +  +

2
( − 1)2 (25)
3.5.5 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate 1+ a c c o r d i n gt oaT a y l o rr u l e
of the form:
ln
µ
1+
1+
¶
=  ln
³ 

´
+  ln
µ


¶
+ 
 , (26)
23where , ,a n d denote steady-state values of the respective variable and 
 is a mildly
persistent additive interest rate shock.
3.5.6 Calibration and Shock Processes
Time is measured in quarters. Labor hours are normalized to unity and the parameter κ is cal-
ibrated such that the steady-state value of labor hours  is equal to 03. The discount factor
 is calibrated to 099. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function ()= = 
 with
 =1 . Calibration of the Phillips curve is done by comparing the slop of the log-linear version
of the Phillips curve presented above with the log-linear version of the Phillips curve under the
Calvo-Yun approach, for which the slope coeﬃcient can be expressed as
(1−ˆ )(1−ˆ )
ˆ  . We set the
demand elasticity  =6(compatible with a monopolistic mark-up of 12 w h i c hi si nl i n ew i t h
the data), and given a value of ˆ  =0 75 (consistent with most empirical evidence on the average
length of price adjustment), equating the slope coeﬃcients of the two Phillips curves delivers a
value  =
ˆ (−1)
(1−ˆ )(1−ˆ ) ≈ 175.T h e T a y l o r r u l e c o e ﬃcients  and  are set equal to 15 and
054, respectively. The parameter  in the transition function (2) is chosen to be 300 as
in Franses and van Dijk [12] which produces a smooth approximation of the indicator function [].
The remaining trust model parameters ( =1 28, 2 = −035,  =0 5) are calibrated in order
to contemporaneously satisfy the following three conditions. First, the parameter values shall be
consistent with the extended trust game. Second the utility function of the representative agent
shall be well-behaved for non-negative consumption quantities. Third, the steady-state level of ag-
gregate trust  matches the unconditional long-run average of aggregate ECB trust (see below).
The shocks considered include the standard macro shocks (i.e. technology, monetary policy, and
government spending) as well as a novel trust shock. Aggregate productivity follows a stationary
AR(1) process of the form  = 

−1exp(
),where its steady-state value  is normalized to unity,
 =0 95,a n d =0 008. 
 is an i.i.d. productivity shock. Log-government expenditures are
modeled exogenously and evolve according to ln
³


´
=  ln
³
−1

´
+ 

,where the steady-state
value  is calibrated such that

 =0 25. 

 is an i.i.d. government spending shock with stan-
dard deviation . We follow Perotti [18] and set  =0 9 and  =0 007. The autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of the monetary policy shock  and the standard deviation of the i.i.d. interest rate
shock  are set to 02 and 0006, respectively, as in Rudebusch [21]. The trust shock is estimated
24through an AR(1) model with drift using a semi-annual time series of aggregate ECB trust based
on the Eurobarometer survey data. The time series contains data for all 17 Euro area countries
from 1999:S1 to 2011:S1. Each country is considered in the sample from the country’s respective
entry to the Euro area. The functional form showing the (highly signiﬁcant) point estimates reads
as 
 =0 101 + 0844
−1 + 
. Recall, however, that we simulate a quarterly model. Hence, the
parameter estimates of the AR(1) process using semi-annual data need to be adjusted accordingly.
Let a circumﬂex denote variables with quarterly data frequency. An equivalent AR(1) model can
then be formulated as ˆ 
 =( 1+) + 2
ˆ 
−2 + ˆ 
−1 +ˆ 
,where  and  refer to drift and
autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the AR(1) model with quarterly data frequency, respectively. Given
the equivalence of both models, it follows that  =0 053,  =0 92,a n d =0 045 provided
that the estimated variance of the regression residuals is equal to 0.004. The adjusted parameters
imply an unconditional long-run average of aggregate ECB trust of 0654. The calibration of the
trust model parameters is chosen such that the steady-state level of aggregate trust  matches
this value.
4 Quantitative Analysis
We now simulate our model in response to a number of shocks to assess the link between trust and
the transmission mechanism of macroeconomic and policy shocks. In commenting the results of
the simulations we will also evaluate the ability of the model in ﬁtting the transmission mechanism
highlighted by the empirical analysis presented above.
We will consider traditional macroeconomic and policy shocks (technology, government spend-
ing and monetary policy shocks) as well as the newly estimated trust shock.
Figure 4 shows impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% increase in technology for given
policy stance and trust parameters. An increase in technology rises production and consumption
demand. This in turn increases welfare and the fraction of agents who trust the policy maker as
per equation 13. It is also worth highlighting the diﬀerence in the shock transmission between our
model and the traditional sticky price model. In the latter, an increase in technology produces
an increase in output and aggregate demand; as prices are sticky ﬁrms react to the increase in
demand by saving on employment, which falls, and by reducing the marginal cost. In the model
25with time-varying trust, the stochastic discount factor falls by more than in the standard sticky
price model: as trust raises the price of future risk falls. This has two implications. First, ﬁrms
discount future proﬁts more heavily, hence they front load production decisions. This, in the model
with time-varying trust, results in an increase in employment. Second, a fall in the stochastic
discount factor downgrades the impact of future expectations of inﬂation on the current one as per
equation 24. In response to a technology shock inﬂation falls today, but raises in the future: in
the traditional macro model this can be achieved, consistently with equation 24, only through a
fall in the marginal cost and employment. In the model with time-varying trust future inﬂationary
pressures have a milder impact on current inﬂation, hence current deﬂation does not necessarily
imply a fall in employment.
Figure 5 shows impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% increase in the policy rate. Once
again the fall in production and consumption, following the contractionary policy, reduces the level
of trust as per equation 13. The ensuing increase in the stochastic discount factor, the price of
future risk, reinforces the contractionary eﬀects of the increase in the policy rate. Notice that
the fall in trust, following a contractionary monetary policy, is consistent with the VAR evidence
presented in section 2. The eﬀect in the data however is milder than the one obtained in the model.
Figure 6 shows impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% increase in government spending.
Due to a traditional crowding out eﬀect consumption falls; this in turn reduces trusts as per
equation 13. Fluctuations in trust in response to government spending shocks are milder than the
ones obtained in response to other macroeconomic shocks, hence its impact on the business cycle
is rather unimportant in this case.
Finally ﬁgure 7 shows impulse response functions of selected variables to the newly estimated
trust shock. The increase in trust is largely expansionary. We can examine the interaction between
the evolution of trust and the monetary policy by analyzing the consumption Euler equation, which
can be written as follows:
1=

+1


µ
1+
+1
¶
.
From the impulse responses following a trust shock we know that the nominal interest rate
decreases and the real interest rate 1+ increases (not shown as a separate IRF). As a result,
26the stochastic discount factor decreases. This can only happen if inﬂation expectations decrease
over proportionally relative to the decrease in the nominal interest rate. This is what we would
expect following a positive central bank trust shock. Intuitively as trust raises, the price of future
risk falls: as a consequence households increase their consumption demand and ﬁrms increase their
demand for employment. As the agents perceive an improvement in the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀs,
inﬂation falls in anticipation despite the increase in aggregate demand.
Notice that consistently with the empirical evidence presented above a positive trust shock is
expansionary as it increases output. The VAR evidence however shows that the policy rate falls
on impact only for a very short period of time, while this is not the case in the model. Clearly the
background monetary model which we use is very stylized: a number of additional eﬀects which
are not considered here could explain this discrepancy.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Large crises tend to revive the idea that trust in large institutions and policy making is highly
sensitive to aggregate conditions and ﬂuctuates at high frequencies. We conduct an empirical
analysis showing the two way causality between public trust in policy making and the eﬃcacy of
the monetary policies. We laid down a simple macroeconomic model which relies on game theoretic
foundations of the aggregate equilibrium level of trust. The quantitative results of the model, which
are in line with our empirical evidence, help us to deepen the understanding of the link between
trust and the monetary transmission mechanism.
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6A p p e n d i x 1
Note that in the basic and the extended trust game, the individual agents solely base their decisions
to trust or not to trust on payoﬀ diﬀerences. Assume, for instance, that the central bank plays
 with probability one and that the agents’ payoﬀs are as before. It will then be beneﬁcial for
the individual agent to choose  if 2 − 1 ≥ 0 and vice versa. Assume that there is a representa-
tive agent who optimally chooses aggregate labor supply  that is distributed equally among the
individual agents and inelastically across strategy proﬁles in the trust game (i.e. regardless of the
agents’/the central bank’s decisions). Denote this individual labor supply as ˜  =˜  ∀  where
 refers to the location of the agent on the unit interval. Furthermore, assume that (˜ ) is an
increasing function in ˜  representing the disutility of supplying labor, that individual agents are
homogeneous with respect to (˜ ), and that the disutility of labor enters additively in the agents’
utility functions. In the same setup as before, it then follows that it is beneﬁcial for the individual
agent to choose  if 2 − (˜ ) − [1 − (˜ )] = 2 − 1 ≥ 0 and vice versa. Hence, incorporating
l a b o ri ns u c haw a yd o e sn o ta ﬀect the agents’ decisions in the trust game and can therefore be
abstracted from at this stage.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of selected variables to technology shocks.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of selected variables to monetary policy shocks.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of selected variables to government spending shocks.
335 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.5
1
1.5
Output
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.5
1
1.5
Consumption
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.5
1
1.5
Employment
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
−10
−5
0
Nominal interest rate (net)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
Inflation (gross)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
5
10
Central bank trust
Figure 7: Impulse responses of selected variables to trust shocks.
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Figure 8: Evolution of trust in the ECB and ECB net trust. The ﬁgure presents the evolution
of trust in the ECB (solid line) and ECB net trust as deﬁned before (dashed line) for selected
countries used in the study and the whole time period from 1999:S1 to 2011:S1.
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses (VAR-Model 1, part I). The ﬁgure presents selected impulse responses
to one standard deviation innovations. Endogenous variables are ECB net trust as deﬁned before,
real GDP growth, HICP inﬂation deviation from the target level, and the EONIA rate. Mean
impulse responses are calculated following Pesaran and Shin (1998) and are shown together with
+/- two standard deviations conﬁdence bands. The VAR was estimated on pooled panel data
controlling for country-speciﬁc time-constant heterogeneity and assuming slope homogeneity. The
sample covers the time period 1999:S1 to 2011:S1.
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses (VAR-Model 1, part II). The ﬁgure presents selected impulse re-
sponses to one standard deviation innovations. Endogenous variables are ECB net trust as deﬁned
before, real GDP growth, HICP inﬂation deviation from the target level, and the EONIA rate.
Mean impulse responses are calculated following Pesaran and Shin (1998) and are shown together
with +/- two standard deviations conﬁdence bands. The VAR was estimated on pooled panel data
controlling for country-speciﬁc time-constant heterogeneity and assuming slope homogeneity. The
sample covers the time period 1999:S1 to 2011:S1.
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Figure 11: The ﬁgure presents selected impulse responses to one standard deviation innovations in
Model 2. Endogenous variables are ECB net trust as deﬁned before, real GDP growth, and the
EONIA rate. Mean impulse responses are calculated following Pesaran and Shin (1998) and are
shown together with +/- two standard deviations conﬁdence bands. The VAR was estimated on
pooled panel data controlling for country-speciﬁc time-constant heterogeneity and assuming slope
homogeneity. The crisis sample covers the time period 2007:S2 to 2011:S1.
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Table 1  Variable Description 
The table presents a description of the variables used in the first-stage and second-stage estimation. For the sake of 
parsimonious exposition, the respective reference group is not displayed in the case of categorical variables. 
Variable Description  Source 
Trust in the ECB  A dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent tends to 
trust the European Central Bank. 
Eurobarometer 
Age34  A dummy variable indicating that the age of the respondent was less 
than or equal to 34 years. 
Eurobarometer 
Age35_64  A dummy variable indicating that the age of the respondent was larger 
than 34 and less than or equal to 64 years. 
Eurobarometer 
Male  A dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male or female.  Eurobarometer 
Couple  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is married, remarried, 
or currently living with partner. 
Eurobarometer 
Single  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent has never or 
previously lived with a partner. 
Eurobarometer 
Divorced  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is currently divorced 
or separated. 
Eurobarometer 
Self Employed  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is currently self-
employed. 
Eurobarometer 
Retired  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is currently retired or 
unable to work due to illness. 
Eurobarometer 
Unemployed  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is temporarily not 
working, a student, or responsible for ordinary shopping only. 
Eurobarometer 
High School 
Degree 
A dummy indicating that the respondent was between 15 and 17 years 
old when full time education was completed. If the respondent was still 
in full time education at the time the survey was conducted, the 
education level corresponding to the respondent's current age was 
assumed. 
Eurobarometer 
College Degree  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent was more than 17 
years old when full time education was completed. If the respondent 
was still in full time education at the time the survey was conducted, the 
education level corresponding to the respondent's current age was 
assumed. 
Eurobarometer 
Political Position 
Left 
Respondents place themselves on a scale ranging where 1 represents 
left-wing and 10 right-wing political views. The dummy variable 
indicates that the respondent has placed herself either in category 1, 2, 
3, or 4. 
Eurobarometer 
GDP Growth  Semi-annual growth rates constructed using data on seasonally adjusted 
chain-linked quarterly real gross domestic product (reference year: 
2000). 
Eurostat 
HICP Inflation 
Deviation 
Absolute difference between the semi-annual rate of change of the 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices constructed using monthly data 
(reference year: 2005) and the European Central Bank’s implied 
implicit semi-annual inflation target of 0.995 per cent assuming 
constant compounding. 
Eurostat 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Semi-annual unemployment rates constructed using quarterly 
seasonally adjusted data. 
Eurostat 
ECB Policy Rate  Semi-annual interest rates on the European Central Bank’s main 
refinancing operations (either minimum bid rate or fixed rate depending 
on the respective time period) calculated using quarterly data. 
Eurostat 
EONIA Rate  Semi-annual effective overnight reference rates for the Euro calculated 
using quarterly data on the Euro Over Night Index Average. 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
EURIBOR 3m  Semi-annual effective reference rates for the Euro calculated using 
quarterly data on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (maturity: 3 month). 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
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Table 2  Summary Statistics – Part I 
The table presents summary statistics for trust in the ECB and the socio-economic characteristics used in the first-stage fully-
saturated linear probability model estimation. A detailed variable description can be found in table 1. For the sake of 
parsimonious exposition, the respective reference group is not displayed. 
First Stage 
Variable Observations  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Trust in the ECB  241,131 0.690  0.462  0.000  1.000 
Age34  241,131 0.271  0.445  0.000  1.000 
Age35_64  241,131 0.535  0.499  0.000  1.000 
Male  241,131 0.499  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Couple  241,131 0.645  0.479  0.000  1.000 
Single  241,131 0.198  0.399  0.000  1.000 
Divorced  241,131 0.077  0.266  0.000  1.000 
Self Employed  241,131 0.089  0.285  0.000  1.000 
Retired  241,131 0.248  0.432  0.000  1.000 
Unemployed  241,131 0.223  0.416  0.000  1.000 
High School Degree  241,131 0.185  0.388  0.000  1.000 
College Degree  241,131 0.586  0.492  0.000  1.000 
Political Position Left  241,131 0.323  0.468  0.000  1.000 
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Table 3  Summary Statistics – Part II 
The table presents summary statistics for the macroeconomic indicators and the resulting ECB net trust used in the second-stage VAR estimation. A detailed variable description can be found in 
table 1. The crisis sample covers the time period 2007:S2 to 2011:S1. Hence, the beginning of the active phase of the crisis coincides with the financial turmoil of August 2007 inter alia associated 
with the United States subprime mortgage market and severe tensions in interbank markets around the globe (see, for instance, Angelini et al., 2011, Duchin et al., 2010, and Trichet, 2010). 
Second Stage 
Variable Observ.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  Observ.  Mean S.D.  Min  Max Observ. Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
  Full Sample  Non-Crisis Sample  Crisis Sample 
ECB Net Trust  325  0.007 0.102 -0.395  0.202  201  0.032 0.084 -0.165  0.202  124  -0.033 0.115 -0.395  0.195 
GDP  Growth  325  0.971 1.708 -6.288  5.647  201  1.532 1.171 -1.256  5.647  124  0.062 2.026 -6.288  4.482 
HICP  Inflation  325  1.120 0.922 -2.438  5.006  201  1.158 0.653 -0.276  3.231  124  1.058 1.241 -2.438  5.006 
HICP Inflation Deviation  325  0.701  0.611  0.001  4.011  201  0.542 0.397 0.001  2.236  124  0.960 0.785 0.001  4.011 
Unemployment  Rate  325  7.495 3.093 1.850 20.600  201  7.238 2.747 1.850 14.600  124  7.911 3.556 3.050 20.600 
ECB Policy Rate  325  2.650  1.155  1.000  4.750  201  2.938 0.862 2.000  4.750  124  2.184 1.398 1.000  4.125 
EONIA  Rate  325 2.667  1.321  0.375  4.925 201 3.047 0.881 2.030  4.925  124  2.050 1.647 0.375  3.971 
EURIBOR  3m  325 2.899  1.311  0.709  4.923 201 3.085 0.854 2.038  4.923  124  2.597 1.787 0.709  4.843 
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Table 4  Multivariate OLS Regressions - Socio-economic Characteristics 
The table presents estimation results from multivariate ordinary least squares regressions. Values of the t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity as LPM residuals are heteroscedastic by construction. 
***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Variables  Dependent: Trust in the European Central Bank 
(1)  (2)  
Age34  -0.036 *** -0.028 *** 
  (-8.871)  (-6.922)   
      
Age35_64  -0.033 *** -0.031 *** 
  (-9.675)  (-9.312)   
      
Male  0.026 *** 0.026 *** 
  (13.456)  (13.419)   
      
Couple  0.030 *** 0.029 *** 
  (7.643)  (7.388)   
      
Single  0.021 *** 0.020 *** 
  (4.544)  (4.445)   
      
Divorced  -0.026 *** -0.021 *** 
  (-5.012)  (-4.115)   
      
Self Employed  -0.006 * 0.005   
  (-1.813)  (1.479)   
       
Retired  -0.010 *** -0.004   
  (-3.207)  (-1.285)   
       
Unemployed  -0.020 *** -0.021 *** 
  (-7.707)  (-8.060)   
      
High School Degree  0.045 *** 0.037 *** 
  (14.640)  (11.815)   
      
College Degree  0.112 *** 0.108 *** 
  (44.587)  (41.125)   
      
Political Position Left  -0.049 *** -0.042 *** 
  (-24.220)  (-20.551)   
      
Constant  0.632 *** 0.601 *** 
  (128.700)  (109.633)   
Country Fixed Effects  No    Yes   
Observations  241,131  241,131   
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